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The Problems of Political Governance and Threats to Geographical Partition in Sudan

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Abstract

This research aims to clarify the Sudan's problems of political governance and threats of geographical partition into smaller States. This research revealed failure of Sudanese political parties to achieve a common formula for political governance, which might be due to dissimilarity of their intellectual backgrounds, particularly the communist and Islamic streams. This put Sudan into a unrest and socio-political conflicts. This research also depicted that the British colonial administration laid the seeds of the partition of Sudan by implementing the policy of enclosed areas and cultural separation between northern Sudan, and the regions of southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and the Anqasana. The research views that the failure of Sudanese political parties to achieve agreed on political governance have produced good opportunities for imperialism to develop plans to divide Sudan. The formulation of a joint political-social contract to achieve political governance will enable keeping the Sudan unified.

Keywords: governance, political parties, political failure, partition of Sudan, imperialism, globalization

Introduction

The geographical composition of Sudan has taken the form of a unified state since it settled during the British colonial period. The political parties have not succeeded in creating agreed-upon political governance through which all components of the country can practice their political activity according to agreed-upon principles. This has resulted in a large number of military coups and finally the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

Sudan was subjected to British colonialism, which imposed policies of ethno-cultural separation on some parts of Sudan, which provided a suitable environment for rebellion and the pursuit of secession. The forces of modern global imperialism have taken this imperialist ground as a base to seek to divide Sudan into small, weak, and warring states in order to be able to exploit its natural and human resources.

This research aims to clarify the Sudan's problems of political governance and threats of geographical partition into smaller States.

1- The problem of political governance

Some of Sudan's political problems are attributed to colonial policies, but many of them were created by the ruling elite after the departure of colonialism (Ahmed, 2010). Since Sudan's independence, the national debate has developed around three topics, including realizing national identity, sharing political power, and unbalanced socio-economic development (Bob, 1990).

British colonialism worked to exploit religion to tear apart national unity in Sudan. Christian missionary campaigns in South Sudan were working to spread Christianity and incite against the Islamic religion and portray it as a racist religion (El-Buni, 1996). Thus, religious differences in Sudan became one of the causes of conflict and political instability. Muslim attempts to implement Islamic law - the religion of the majority - led to

opposition from non-Muslim minorities, especially in South Sudan. This is because the colonial policy led to the South being “composed of a majority that adheres to tribal religions, a Muslim group, and an educated southern elite that sees its African and English culture a protection against Arabization, and its Christianity a protection against Islam, and in both together they have a distinct identity” (El- Mahdi, 1982).

The linguistic aspect took place in the colonial project to create ethnic units, “tribal units” and self-contained “enclosed areas” in Sudan. The colonial policy aimed to build false tribal ethnic identities for them in the Nuba Mountains. Language and education were the tools used to complete this innovative project. The paths of the state-directed linguistic policy in Sudan have strategically moved the traditional linguistic-educational and socio-linguistic framework as a means of imposing nationalist ideologies. Through the social framework burdened with tensions and contradictions in Sudan, graphic representation was chosen, which is considered a mood for political movement. Therefore, education is considered an inherently ideological practice. There is an overlap in the content of colonial and post-colonial linguistic policies, where discursive resources have been manipulated as sites of social resistance over the distribution of material resources in Sudan (Abdelhay, 2010).

After the end of colonialism, the Sudanese inherited a country divided and encapsulated by false borders that forcefully brought together “Arabs,” Muslims, “Africans,” Christians, and other religions (Ibrahim, 2000). When other African countries became independent in the glow of parliamentary luster, Sudan changed its democracy into a military dictatorship (Gretton, 1968). In October 1964, the Sudanese military government shed a little blood and rebuilt a parliamentary government when other democracies were climbing toward one-party rule or military dictatorship. The May 1969 revolution was considered a revolution of consensus, and its government in the period 1969-1977 was considered a government of hope and promise, while in the period 1977-1985, it was considered a distorted government, and the April 1985 uprising was considered an incomplete revolution (Khalid, 1990).

Except for short periods when independent Sudan was ruled by the so-called Sudanese secularists in the period 1953-56 when Khatmiyyah joined forces with the forces of intellectuals, and again between 1964 and March 1965 when the country was ruled by an unelected transitional secular government that was stripped of all its powers once it restored the political sectors. The other was political control. Secularism remained under the military dictatorship of Jaafar al-Numeiri between 1969 and 1977 (Warburg, 1995). Sufi teachings also found opposition from religious fundamentalists and educated people in northern Sudan (Al-Shahi, 1986).

Sudan has witnessed internal wars since its independence in January 1956 and witnessed only ten years of peace in the period 1972-1983. At the heart of these conflicts lies the crisis of national identity. Those who assumed political control of Sudan define themselves as Arabs and Muslims who belong to the Middle East more than to Black Africa, even though they are essentially Arab-Africans. Their physical features resemble the African groups in the region, and their cultures are a mixture of Arab and Islamic cultures, alongside which there are local systems and cultures (Deng, 2006).

It is possible to understand the difficulty of achieving political stability in Sudan when taking into account the inherent and strong cultural, political, and demographic features that distinguish it (Bechtold, 1990). These features are considered a legacy that society uses as a social, political, or economic resource. Heritage is open to interpretation and its value can be understood from different points of view, often reflecting divisions in society. The division or schism of cultural and economic uses also leads to the emergence of a strong conflict of interests (Graham et al. 2016). There is a relationship between this formation and political identities due to the existence of a historical institutional hierarchy formed in the political framework of Sudan. This hierarchy enables us to identify the centrality of the historical myth of slavery and colonialism in post-colonial Sudan (Idris, 2005). The disparity in the sources of political thought of the Sudanese political parties resulted in the disparity of visions in political action, resulting in many internal tensions and political dialectics at the regional level (Marchal, 2010).

The unbalanced regional development between “Northern” and “Southern” Sudan is part of the bitter and sad differences between the two regions (Ibrahim, 2000). Federalism, rooted in Sudan's political history, has become a central topic in political dialogue in South Sudan (Johnson, 2014). The “elite” in North and South Sudan, as is the case in low-capacity states, is led by the issue of “nationalism.” (Evlihan, 2007). The

confrontations between Africans and Arabs in the Nile Valley are seen as a struggle over nationalism, one rooted in Africanism and the other in Arabism (Wai,1981).

For a long period, religion was not a factor in the conflict between the Muslims of northern Sudan and the traditional Africans of southern Sudan (Pogge, 2002). Traditional schools attribute the conflict between North and South Sudan to ethnic, tribal, cultural, and religious causes(Suliman,1998). The first civil war between North and South Sudan was a collection of ethnic, religious, political, and economic problems that faced Sudan since the advent of Turkish-Egyptian rule in 1821 AD. This conflict included external forces with interests in Sudan (Pogge, 2008).The civil wars are considered a conflict between contradictory identities between North and South Sudan, especially since identity is defined in ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious frameworks and shows how people define themselves.

The question of identity affects the nature of political, social, and cultural participation in Sudan, where there is a clear anomaly in models of identity conflict. There is the Arab-Islamic model in northern Sudan and the African model in southern Sudan. Although the people of northern Sudan are considered Arabs, they are in fact a hybrid of Arab and African elements, as African physical characteristics prevail in most tribal groups. This occurred as a result of the historical process that classified races, cultures, and religions “class-wise” and supported the “passage” into the Arab-Islamic model, which was distinguished vis-à-vis African cultures and races. A polarization resulted that relied more on myth than on reality. The identity crisis was further complicated by the efforts of the people of northern Sudan to shape the country according to the Arab-Islamic identity (Deng, 2011).

The Sudanization policy of using the Arabic language and religion by the Sudanese government is considered a conscious and comprehensive abuse of the traditional values, social system, and cultures of the South by the North. The change in linguistic policy reached its peak in 1949 AD when Arabic became the official language of Sudan (Nyombe, 1994). The politicization of the Arabic language in Sudan is considered a product of the practices of British colonialism, which planned to confuse the Arabic language with Islam as a pigmented identity. This process resulted in “Northern Sudan” versus “Southern Sudan”. The post-independence rulers supported this colonial linguistic policy (Abdelhay et al. 2011).

Over the centuries, an Arabization process took place in Sudan, including the gradual spread of Arab identity and the Arabic language among the northern Sudanese. The British colonial policies favored a few elites through the "Arab communities" who went on to consciously develop the concept of Sudanese Arab national identity in the process of adopting the term "Sudanese" derived from the Arabic word Sawad (Blackness).

After the end of colonialism in 1956, these nationalists attributed Arabization in the form of an official policy to rapidly propagate the Arabic language throughout the country. This policy contradicts the policy of British rule and was the cause of civil war in South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and more recently in Darfur. Aside from Arabization, the Arabization policy has sharpened non-Arab and psychologically conscious African identities, “comprehensive and dual-cultural” in some cases. The Arabization policy was accompanied by the growth of the ideology of Arab cultural and ethnic supremacy, which is most emphasized in Darfur now (Sharkey, 2008).The matter was not limited to South Sudan only but included the entire country. The elite of the North failed to understand the nature of this change, which caused their inability to know the necessary factors that led to the success of negotiations with the rebel parties (Taisier et al. 1999).

The African-Arab conflict in the Nile Valley is seen as a conflict based on nationalism, one of which is rooted in Africanism, and the other is rooted in Arabism (Wai,1981). A process of “Arabization” took place in Sudan over many centuries, which included the gradual spread of both the Arab identity and the Arabic language among the inhabitants of the north. In the period following the victory of the British-Egyptian army in 1898 AD, British colonial policies favored a “small elite” from these “Arab” communities, who worked to develop and develop the concept of Sudanese Arab national identity with clear awareness in a process in which the term “Sudanese” was adopted.

The nationalists were active after the end of colonialism, in developing policies that worked to strengthen the spread of the Arabic language and the process of “Arabization” quickly in geographical borders that spoke their local languages, which contradicted the pre-colonial policies of Arabization. This situation has become linked to civil conflicts in South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur. In addition to spreading “Arabism,” the policy

of Arabizing non-Arab “African” identities consciously intensified, accompanied by a growth policy of the doctrine of Arab culture and racial transcendence (Sharkey, 2008). Likewise, the imposition of colonial values and customs was unsettling for “gender” relations. In less developed South Sudan, men and women relied on grassroots to form their political associations, which organized and supported themselves and forced their organizations to develop strategies to survive the longest civil war in Africa. In the Nile region and the north, which is more urban and developed, where British parliamentary institutions and official laws prevail, people relied more on forming their political organizations on hierarchical organizations. These included sectarian and nationalist and religious parties, in addition to their political affiliation, with the exception of the General Federation of Workers’ Unions, which was a hierarchical grouping established by males. Northern women followed the pattern of organizations created by males, forming fronts based on grassroots (Ibrahim, 2000).

The political work of Islamists has greatly influenced Sudanese politics and the political-social conflict therein. The Islamic State in Sudan has declared a distinct doctrine whose declared goal is to create a prototype of the Islamic State (Gallab, 2008). Four years after the fall of Jaafar al-Numeiri's rule, the relationship between Islam and the state continued to become a thorny issue in Sudanese politics. The main issue in the protracted Sudanese political crisis remains, either the state declares secularism from the standpoint of the diversity of cultures, ethnic composition, etc., or it becomes an Islamic state to defend the Muslim majority of the northern Sudanese. Sudan gained its independence, like the rest of the African nations, before the nations themselves were formed. Therefore, the task of forming the nation became the current concern, strongly polarized by social and political forces. Although Islam has always been considered a fundamental topic in Sudanese politics, it would be too simple to view the current conflict in the country within the framework of the “Arab” and “Muslim” north versus the “pagan” and “African” south (Bob, 1990).

Efforts in Sudan to impose an Islamic state and Islamic constitution on a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society led to a long civil war, endless military coups, and political, social, and economic unrest. The Mahadism came in 1881 AD to renew and purify Islam. It was, in fact, an uprising against a corrupt Islamic government, the foreign Turkish-Egyptian ruling elite (Warburg, 2003). Sudan achieved an Islamic revolution without violence. Through a “creeping” revolution that began in the 1970s, Islamic fundamentalists increased their power through wealth and organized control over the civil service, the economy, the judiciary, and the armed forces. In fact, the main political parties in the north, with the exception of the Communist Party, have sided with religious parties, as this does not mean that all Muslims support Sharia’a. Fundamentalists make up 20% of Sudan's Muslim population, but they are wealthier and more motivated. The implementation of Sharia’a was accompanied by the strengthening of dictatorial rule, the weakening of institutions, the crushing of civil liberties, the escalation of the civil war in South Sudan, and the worsening of economic problems. The revolution has caused concern in Washington and some Arab and African countries, but there is no evidence yet that Sudan poses a direct threat to its neighbors (Lesch, 1995).

One of the most prominent elements from the April 2010 elections is the significant absence of the traditional religious parties that have dominated the political scene since independence, and the strengthening of the military-Islamic alliance in Khartoum since 1989. This outcome is considered a result of the combination of the effects of state policies followed during the last two decades and long-term social changes. The absence of the “sectarian system” created a structural change in the country’s political development, which was apparently characterized by an inescapable circular process between unstable democracy and military governments. The elections failed to meet the hopes and aspirations of those who hoped that they could create an inclusive political space and make unity attractive (Musso, 2012).

In Muslim northern Sudan, there are two transitional institutions with regard to gender and sexuality, the Sudanese Communist Party and its affiliate the Sudan Women’s Union, and the Muslim state, represented by the National Islamic Front, which is the former Muslim Brotherhood and later the National Congress Party. These two social institutions are considered important poles in the Sudanese political spectrum and in their relationship with women. The Sudanese Communist Party is characterized by progressivism, secularism, and non-discrimination by gender, while the National Islamic Front is considered conservative, religious, oppressive for women, and traditional, neither secular nor gender-just (Hale, 2005). Sudanese women followed different methods that helped introduce the “quota” for women in 2008 and implemented it in the parliamentary elections

in 2010. One of the biggest achievements of the quota system was to help increase the involvement of women in political work and not just increase their representation in Parliament. It also posed a challenge to political parties in fielding female candidates in core geographic constituencies.

Political change in Sudan after 1989 AD led to a gathering momentum with the government introducing policies of control and restrictions on one side, and the increasing numbers of civil society organizations looking to establish and legitimize their control and identity and ensure their continued existence on the other side. The Islamic Front used religion and force to perpetuate and protect the political system that had lost its credibility and legitimacy among many Sudanese. The National Islamic Front emerged as a small political party, and over a period of time it became the third political force after the 1986 elections, and then became a ruling party at the dawn of the military coup in 1989.

The emergence of the Islamic movement in Sudan is in itself a reflection of the deterioration of local initiatives related to social change (Ali,2010), as the relationship between the deteriorating economy and the political crisis in Sudan bears the social foundations of political Islamic movements and the class patterns of businessmen and organized workers (Abdel-Rahim,1986). The Resurgence experienced by the Sudanese radical Islam group, the National Islamic Front, which became clear of its direct connection to the civil war in the south in September 1958, raises some important and pressing questions about the intersection between Africanism and political Islam. The dynamic of the conflict between them is unusual. Although Islam spread within the framework of a large peace process throughout most of Africa, and intertwined with traditional local institutions over centuries. Some important points emerged from the dynamics of this process and led to the creation of conflicts. Examples of this are the Othman Dan Fodio Jihadist Movement and the Mahadism movement in Sudan. These movements relied on awareness of the discrepancy between the true content of the message of Islam and practice through habituation to the African population, who are largely Muslims in name or nominally. These movements interacted with local forces to create a new form of Islamic observance action (El-Afandi, 1990).

The Collier-Hoeffler framework considers recalcitrant economic opportunity as the causative factor for civil conflict. This framework has been applied in Africa, but it did not provide sufficient tools to analyze the underlying conditions that led to the insurgency in Sudan. Therefore, it is not the rebellious economic opportunity that is primarily behind the rebellion in South Sudan and Darfur, but rather the socio-economic injustice stemming from culturally and regionally imposed political marginalization. This could open a door to understanding this conflict and not limit it to the economic agenda of analysis only (Ylonen, 2005). There is a feeling that the current conflict in Sudan has narrative aspects, given that the process of the development of Islam in Sudan is not one-sided and works to bring about the collision of two dissimilar cultures that have gone through the experience of renewal. The introduction of culture as a dynamic external factor is considered a new and important development because of its connection to evolving internal factors (El-Afandi, 1990).

An important political shift occurred in the composition of the state and in power relations, as it put an end to the historical political hegemony limited to the north exclusively following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in 2005 AD (Ahmed,2009). Usually, either partial implementation or violation of these agreements occurs by one of the parties to the agreement (Ahmed, 2010). The attempt to define and distinguish the relationship between the National Islamic Front and the sectarian and secular parties in Sudan must begin with an assessment of the impact of Islam on the Sudanese political scene since the first days in which the Arabized Islamic groups controlled the centers of power in central Sudan (Ahmed, 2008).

The Darfur region until 1994 with its five current states remained a single and integrated political and administrative unit since the founding of the Kira Kingdom in the seventeenth century AD (Takana, 2008). The Black Book was secretly published in Sudan and had a major impact on political dialogue. The book claimed to seek to introduce the patterns of political control of the people of northern Sudan in the post-colonial period. This is the same vision adopted by many of the rebel movements in Sudan that fight not only as a result of ethnic or religious discrimination but also because of marginalization that neglects the development of the population of marginal regions (Cobham,2006). Violent incidents within groups usually affect political ideas towards members outside the group. Violence deepens hatred and reduces the possibilities of supporting

understanding and accepting concessions, while it encourages mediation and cohesion to prevent conflict. It is possible for violence to fuel hatred towards out-groups, according to the results of a study in Greater Khartoum in 2010 and 2011, where political violence intensifies the negative tendencies of individuals within the group and makes them accept separation in order to avoid living side by side with members from outside the group (Berber et al. 2014). Over the last two decades, the focus of conflict in Sudan has changed from protest against political marginalization, economic conflict, and cultural control of the north to a clash between competing visions.

There is an influence of the tribal aspect on political action in Sudan. Tribalism is usually reproduced in Sudan by virtue of the expansion of the "tribal" logic through political practice since the Turkish invasion in 1821 AD. The difficulty of practicing political work without the influence of the tribal factor has been confirmed (El Zain, 1996). Colonial rule with its oppressive policies, independence rule with its ideology of building the nation, and Islamic fundamentalism with its universal ideology all preserved, in one way or another, the tribal factor as an essential component of the political system. In many cases, "tribalism" hides a material façade, and may be masked in a religious appearance, which may help in understanding and knowing the truth of the current conditions (El Zain, 1996).

2- The threats of the geographic partition of Sudan

The circumstances of Sudan's political instability are due to its failure to achieve political governance that satisfies its disparate ethnic and political components. Some of other major reasons are the lack of foreign policies following independence of Sudan, irregular interests in foreign affairs, and developmental and ethnic problems rooted since the formation of Sudan as unified State. The conditions of political instability in Sudan created appropriate opportunities for global imperialism and political-economic globalization to develop plans for the partition of Sudan.

Under the policies of global imperialism and globalization, Sudan has become under the hammer of division into mini-states that exploit its natural and human resources in accordance with the policies of colonial governments. The new generation of these colonial governments was built through contemporary investment agreements (Mann, 2003), which were opposed by the New Bandung framework agreement based on a stable North-South regime. Autonomous agreements have seized land and agricultural investments in Africa via Asian states. This bears the characteristic of core-centric models such as accumulation by scarcity or dispossession, which failed to stop the collapse of accumulation strategies in the northern countries. This is because of their connection to the new forces, policies, and movements in the southern countries. Asian investments represent an attempt to meet the rising food demands of the new elite in emerging economies, and class cooperation between them and the African elite, rather than a crisis of accumulation (Martin, et al., 2014).

The countries of the North, within the system of modern imperialism, have increasingly participated in the process of horizontal domination and sovereignty in their quest for access to natural resources by virtue of the growth of the global economy which has become more integrated. They have projected their combined power onto the countries of the Global South to assert vertical control in the ongoing sharing and withdrawal of resources. This domination and control gave rise to a cruciform global structure, where the resulting uneven development was associated with poverty, competition for resources, and conflict (Carmody, 2009).

These imperialist policies were followed by widespread aggression and seizure of lands around the world by international institutions, especially on the African continent, since the emergence of the global financial crisis in 2008 AD, and the associated food crisis. Between 2010 and 2011, an estimated 227 million hectares in the Third World, equivalent to the area of northern and western Europe, were sold, licensed, or leased to foreign institutions. In 2009 alone, 50 million hectares were transferred to these institutions. Some of this land was purchased, while the vast majority was leased over a long period of time, ranging from 25 to 99 years, which usually had to be renewed (Broughton, 2012). These activities cause the problem of climate change in the rich industrial countries of Europe and America, which are able to adapt to climate change while poor countries are unable to do so. (Bachram, 2004) The practices of large multinational companies and institutions, that have interests in cocoa production and are supported by organizations that provide It itself, work to achieve fair trade as a means of reproducing and continuing the slavery of workers around the world. This exploitation is clearly

concentrated among the people of the country of Ivory Coast, which produces 40% of global cocoa production (Athreya, 2011).

For many decades, Sudan has been coveted by many foreign powers that want to control and dominate its resources, or at least obtain them at the lowest prices. They are eager to benefit from the country's natural resources and strategic location. The UAE is considered the largest export destination in Sudan, followed by China. Sudan has agreed to lease millions of acres to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Turkey, and China, and the coastline on the Red Sea is an important sea route (Arabi Post, 2020). In its relentless pursuit of energy sources, China has established relationships with pariah states that the United States seeks to marginalize, which has led to creating tensions with the new Chinese policy (Canning, 2007). Chinese national petroleum companies have become new players in the global petroleum industry in the past two decades. Since it lacks sufficient experience in competing with other international companies in managing huge oil fields, with little experience in political risks and security, it has gained from its experience in Sudan a competitive role in global strategy and in developing its capabilities (Patey, 2017).

George Bush conducted a dialogue with Khartoum, followed by a constructive policy between the two parties, in contrast to Clinton's policy aimed at isolating Sudan. This is due to the influence of the American Church, the importance of combating terrorism, and economic interests, especially the pressure group or the oil lobby (Huliaras, 2006). The efforts made by American activists to pressure Asian companies in Sudan are similar to those efforts to find light in the darkness or swim against the current. While the campaign of plunder and dispossession against Sudan is increasing in the United States, its impact on achieving real results in Sudan remains questionable. These activists failed to integrate Sudan's broad economic and political relations into their various strategies, but they did, arguably, look for ways to put pressure on state-owned enterprises by divestment of the financial market (Patey, 2009).

One of the factors that helped provide a basis for globalization to operate is the developments that occurred in Sudan during the last three decades, which led to a gradual and regular change in the nature of the conflict from the traditional form of an ethnic-religious nature to one over resources. The role of resources increased with the worsening of the economic crisis, as they emerged as an influential force in the civil war in Sudan (Suliman, 1977). This is considered part of the framework of the dialogue on the relationship of oil to development in Africa, as some believe that oil wealth fuels corruption in the state and creates social crises, violent civil conflict, extravagance, and waste. Sudan found increased global interest when it became an exporter of oil, and more attention focused on oil as a source of wealth and power and as a subject of potential conflict. In reality, oil alone will not lead to violence and corruption, as conflict only occurs as a result of the "politicization" of the oil factor in ways that make control over it and its distribution confined to the hands of a few who work to make it exclusive to others (Obi, 2007).

Local conflicts overlap with national and regional conflicts, as issues related to land, play a role in creating poverty and driving and sustaining ongoing conflicts driven by an agenda that works from the top down and the bottom up (Sorbo, 2010). In the issue of South Sudan, there are concealed dimensions that include the general confrontation between the center and the margins in a state characterized by total inequality in power and resources, and the intense conflict over diminishing resources among ethnic groups in different parts of Sudan (Kok, 1996). It became clear that the famine that occurred among the Dinka in the period 1985-88 was rooted in the exploitation of northern Sudanese traders. This was due to the policies of the central government as well as international interests, as international donors found "room to operate" that enabled them to use policies that were effective to a long extent (Keen, 1991).

Sudan has emerged as a cornerstone of developing economies, linking the oil-rich Arab countries to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, making it vulnerable to modern imperialist ambitions. It has received significant grants and loans from Arab countries to increase its agricultural productivity so that it becomes a food basket for the Arab world and to achieve regional food security so that it can avoid any economic boycott imposed on it by the Western world in the future. Until recently, Sudan was not an expected element linking the desires and interests of Arabs and sub-Saharan Africa. The African continent and the Middle East region have gone through the experienced of separatist movements carried out by local nationalities in the past decades, often supported by

external interests and concerns to achieve their political or economic imperialist goals. In this context, the forces of the left and right struggled to decide the national issue in South Sudan.

Seven years after the government of Jaafar al-Nimeiry in Sudan (1969-1985), which achieved some success during the first two years, the government drifted towards programs dependent on Western aid and investment, which was accompanied by violent suppression of the Sudanese military and organized unions and the Sudanese Communist Party in 1971 AD. This repression reflects the conflict between Numeiri's government and the Sudanese popular forces over which social classes should lead the struggle for social change. This led to the strong alliance between Sadat's Egypt and the rich oil-producing Arab countries as partners in Sudan's economic development. These countries see Sudan as a showcase for agri-business in the Middle East. Whatever the promise of such development trends, they represent the most important economic and political changes in Sudan since the entry of British colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century (Collins, 1976).

Sudanese politics has become complex since the 1964 revolution as a result of many intertwined and often contradictory factors. Although Sudan is located along a belt of partly Christian and partly Muslim countries, however, it did not find acceptance or love from the Christian governments in power in those neighboring countries. This was at a time when Sudan had the ability to be a confrontation state between the revolutionary Arabs and the governments that had an orientation towards the Eastern camp and the governments that had an orientation towards the West.

The government of General Abboud from 1958-1964 officially stood for world peace, African unity, Arab unity, non-neutrality, and the struggle of peoples for freedom. But through practice, it became clear that the military government was indifferent to foreign policy at a time when most African countries had determined their position towards the Western or Eastern blocs and Sudan remained far from them. President Abboud's meeting with US President Kennedy in 1961 encouraged good relations between the two countries, but Shawan-Lai's visit to Sudan in January 1974 did not mean much in foreign policy frameworks. It is natural for the military to seek recognition and assistance from powerful countries in order to strengthen their positions. African problems remained present in both national and regional considerations despite the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of external strategic and ideological considerations. Sudanese-American relations developed after the year 2000, although they were characterized by hostility and ferocity before that, especially after the events of September 11. In fact, it is impossible to understand the necessity of continued bilateral cooperation and mutual dependence in achieving internal peace in Sudan and ending the war on terrorism.

3- Conclusions

This research reviewed Sudan's central problems related to political governance and threats of geographical partition. The challenges to political parties to achieve political governance in the country were various. Due to the discrepancy and contradiction of intellectual sources of these political parties, the socio-economic challenges inherited from the British colonial period exacerbated the problems of unbalanced regional development and the imposition of central cultural policies, creating the challenges of failure to achieve political governance in Sudan that leads to a stable and continuous political system. There are some imperialistic plans to divide Sudan into smaller states so as to benefit from its diverse and abundant natural resources. All of these plans do not deviate from the trends of global imperialism and modern globalization in controlling resources, especially in countries that suffer from ethnic conflicts and carry the seeds of fragmentation, including Sudan.

It is necessary that the future political orientations of the Sudanese political parties include building realistic political intellectual frameworks that are far from political theorizing based on imported philosophical debates or based on creating conceptual differences that are not useful in addressing society's socio-economic problems. Preserving Sudan as a state with its own political entity requires the existence of a political system capable of thwarting all these plans. This requires the formulation of a social contract acceptable to all of Sudan's ethnic, cultural, and political components to establish this political system.

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