An Assessment of the Response of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church towards 2007 Post-Election Violence in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya


Dr. Thomas Otieno Juma , Davis Nyaoko Ogaro ,

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Volume 7 - March 2018 (03)


This paper sought to assess the response of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church towards 2007 Post Election Violence (PEV) in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya using Eldoret East as the scope for the Church District. By the following objectives; finding out church response as a Peacemaker in conflict, assessing response in Emergency Provision, and examining response in psycho-social support the researchers undertook to assess in the overall how the church responded in the PEV. The Seventh-day Church in Kenya and especially after the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence became one among church actors in the PEV. This study finds a lacuna in peace actors apart from the traditional Faith-Based Organizations; the Catholic church seems to have taken a visible stake whereas SDA like other groups seemed not to have taken a visible frontal role. Based on this, the researchers got interested in what motivated its different stand from other Faith-Based Organizations. Using descriptive design and qualitative research methodology this research used a target sample derived from Pastors, Church members among the twelve churches, Church leaders, and government officials who were Seventh-day Adventist church members. A total of 144 respondents participated in the study employed purposefully. In the end, the researchers picked important information which was reported in the study using indirect reporting method as a number of respondents at the time of study felt the issues were sensitive to their safety. The Biblical Mission theory of Jesus Christ underpinned this study; as used by the SDA, it proposes that the existence of the church is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ which unifies people of all walks of life from socio-economic and political conflicts. The theory guides the response towards violence because the church shall remain neutral while preaching the gospel and at the same time extending charitable acts to the affected. Finally, it determined the kind of response the church took which majorly involved neutrality to all parties in violence while using the church charity institutions to administer the needs of the people (victims of PEV). The study thus concludes that the church indeed responded in a non-traditional method employed by other actors to conflicts/violence in emergency


Election Violence/ SDA and Violence/ Church and Election/ 2007 Election/ 2007 PEV/ PEV in Kenya. 


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